Absolutism and Relativism: Practical Implications for Philosophical Counseling by Koch, Andrew M & NC DOCKS at Appalachian State University
 1 
Koch, Andrew M.  (2000) “Absolutism and Relativism: Practical Implications for 
Philosophical Counseling” Philosophy in the Contemporary World, 7 (4) [Winter 2000] 
Published by the Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World [Permission to 
archive received from the editor of Philosophy in the Contemporary World on April 16, 
2010]   (ISSN: 1077-1999) 
 
 
 
Absolutism and Relativism: Practical Implications for 
Philosophical Counseling 
Andrew M. Koch 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper presents the contrast of two traditions within philosophy, the absolutist and 
relativists positions in relation to psychological counseling.  It is argued that the problems 
presented to philosophical counseling in working out a suitable method cannot be 
divorced from the larger debates within philosophy.  The techniques and assumptions of 
these two traditions will lead counselors and clients in very different directions and 
provide very different answers to the kinds of questions engaged. 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 In an article published in 1995, Louis Marinoff outlines what he considers to be 
the proper relationship between counselors and counselees engaged in a discussion of 
ethics.
1
  Marinoff states, “the counselor should refrain from imparting or imposing 
substantive moral views” in the discussion of a counselee’s moral and ethical problems.  
The counselor must retain a “hands-off” approach, and resist any temptation to assert his 
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or her opinion to the counselee.  Only in this way can the “dignity, autonomy, and 
responsibility” of the counselee be maintained.  This relationship must be maintained 
even if the counselee requests such advice.   
 Marinoff’s prescription is driven by the most noble of intentions.  He asserts that 
counselors should maintain a professional stance, resisting the role of authority figures 
dispensing moral instruction.  To this end, the counselors must be able to assist the 
counselees in seeing new ways of thinking about their problems, highlighting the 
consistencies and inconsistencies among beliefs, values, and potential outcomes of 
action.  In the role of facilitator, the counselor must maintain his or her neutrality by 
adopting what Marinoff calls “meta-ethical relativism” towards the various moral belief 
systems. 
 However, there is a problem with such an approach.  Meta-ethical relativism is a 
philosophical position.  Assuming that the context in a counseling setting is one in which 
there is dialogue between the counselor and the client, it is also likely to assume that 
there will be a learning process taking place within the exchange.  While a case can be 
made for the “desirability” of clients adopting ethical relativism, philosophical 
counseling at a minimum needs to be self-conscious of the implications of such a stance.   
There can be no neutral stance in philosophical counseling.  Contrary to the views 
of Ran Lahav,
2
 and others, philosophic counseling is an intervention.  It has no neutral 
ground on which to stand in the processes of birthing new ideas.  Empowering a world- 
view is a political stance in that it seeks to enact a particular mode of life, a complete 
form of being that is internally consistent.  The very nature of the process will result in 
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the views being reproduced and disseminated in the culture.  To put it another way, there 
is no technique of discourse that can be separated from its content, as the technique is 
essential to the generation of the ideas and principles that make up that content.  
This paper will represent the contrast of two traditions within philosophy, the 
absolutist and relativists positions.  It will be argued that the problems presented to 
philosophical counseling in working out a suitable method cannot be divorced from the 
larger debates within philosophy.  The techniques and assumptions of these two traditions 
will lead counselors and clients in very different directions and provide very different 
answers to the kinds of questions engaged.  Not only is there is no technique by which an 
“objective” answer to philosophical question can be reached, but there is no discussion 
that can be generated outside of the various schools of philosophy.  This implies that 
there is no technique by which a counselor can remain totally neutral.  Given this 
condition the best outcome will result from the complete honesty between the counselor 
and the client with regard to the assumptions engaged.  This will generate trust between 
the counselor and the client and enhance the chance for meaningful outcomes to be 
achieved. 
 
II. Socrates and the Origins of Absolutism 
It is natural that a practice in its infancy would go back to its roots in order to 
formulate its position and carve out its place in the world.  Such is the case with the 
philosophical counseling.  In addition to representing the origins of Western philosophy, 
the value of the Greeks for philosophical counseling is represented in a conception of life 
as an integrated process, with philosophy as its guide.  As Martha Nussbaum describes in 
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The Therapy of Desire, for the Greeks philosophy was about healing the soul.  This could 
only be done if philosophy contains within it the content of a fully integrated way of life.  
This seems, in part, the impetus for the interest in Socrates within the emerging 
practice of philosophical counseling.  The Socratic method is mentioned as a central 
component of the approach offered by the British Society of Consultant Philosophers, 
and name of Socrates appears repeatedly in discussions on philosophical counseling.  The 
general perspective on the value of Socrates is expressed by Ran Lahav and Maria da 
Venza Tillmanns.  In the Introduction to the 1995 volume entitled Essays on 
Philosophical Counseling the editors assert that the “modern approach to philosophical 
counseling bears a striking similarity to … Socrates.  Socrates, who was engaged in 
relentless philosophical inquiries without claiming to have their solution, believed that a 
life worth living is one that examines itself critically and rationally… In what could have 
been written today, Socrates…describes the philosopher as a midwife who helps other 
people give birth to their own ideas…”
3
  This statement reflects an attitude common 
among some practitioners of philosophical counseling.  Socrates is viewed as 
representing an ideal model because he helped others express their ideas. 
The Socratic method discussed by Lahav, Tillmanns, and others, is associated by 
Socrates with what he called the “dialectic.”  But the dialectic to Socrates did not mean 
an open inquiry into all possibilities, but a methodology that would bring the individual 
to an understanding of fixed and eternal “truths.”  The goal of the dialectic is to always 
move discourse toward the unity of “being” and “knowing” in the realm of the forms.
4
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When the mind has an understanding of the forms, it is able to order the world according 
to the pure form of being.
5
 
Therefore, to Socrates the method of the dialectic cannot be separated from the 
“doctrine of the forms.”  Discussed in Book Seven of the Republic and in the Parmenides 
the doctrine of the forms provides both an epistemological underpinning for the Socratic 
method and an ontological claim about “being” in the world.  The dialectic is a process of 
questioning, but towards an integrated understanding of “truth” and “being.” 
Socrates’ theology of “being” would be little more than an interesting story except 
for the fact that it inspired a transcendentalist tradition in Western philosophy.  Plato’s 
transcendentalism inspired elements of Augustine’s thought.  In the modern period, 
Descartes and Kant also were engaged in developing a transcendentalist logic for their 
philosophic systems.  Within this tradition, sense experience is judged to be either 
inconsequential to the real purpose of human life (Augustine) or only the stimulus to the 
mind in its uncovering of transcendental truth (Descartes and Kant).  Each of these 
systems, in their own way, diminished the role of experience and human judgments about 
those experiences in daily life.   
From this perspective, the apparatus of experience, the human body, cannot be the 
source of knowledge.  Knowledge is treated as reflecting a project of defining eternal 
being, whether treated as “forms,” “things in themselves,” or “universal reason.”  Such 
knowledge can only come from reason, transcendentally conceived, as it separates from 
the “shadows” of sense experience.   
Discounting experience as the source of knowledge engages a number of 
implications for social life that would likely pose problems for some aspects of 
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philosophical counseling.  Following the lead of Socrates, this tradition defines 
“knowledge” as pertaining to that which is stable and unchanging.  This includes 
knowledge of human beings.  The subject is treated as a complete and stable object, to 
which an identity is assigned.  “Being” cannot be assigned to that which undergoes 
change.   
This issue has significant implications for the discussion of morals and ethics.  In 
Socrates, medieval theology, and in modern transcendentalist philosophies (ie. Kant) it is 
asserted that moral and ethical principles are to be divorced from experience.  To use 
experience inductively, to draw ethical conclusions from experience, would leave us in a 
situation in which ethics was a subjective preference rather than an eternal truth.  Thus, 
ethical norms would be a reflection of historical forces and subjective interests.  Ethics 
would be less certain.  There would be no firm foundation on which to build ethical life.   
In a counseling setting, however, what happens when a client has a problem that 
is directly related to the process of social and historical change?  Three areas likely to be 
part of any problem that brings a client to a counselor are; sex, family, and work.  Are 
these static or governed by change?  Faced with issues of sexual mores, gender roles, and 
homosexuality does the counselor address the issues as part of the changing context and 
increased individuation, or is difference denounced as morally corrupt deviance, as it 
challenges the traditional notions of normalcy?  What are the moral and ethical issues 
involved in the structure of the family?  Is family structure a moral issue or a personal 
choice?  Is the nuclear family the only acceptable form of family life?  In the area of 
employment, what expectation should an employee have on the job?  What 
responsibilities does an employee have to an employer and vice versa?   
 7 
In all of these cases, the absolutist tradition looks to static concepts, to 
foundational support, in formulating a response to the client.  Looking outside of history 
and experience will lead to a set of suggestions that reject creativity, adaptability, and 
change in favor of conformity to existing and well-worn principles.  In a counseling 
setting, however, there is always the question of what is in the best interest of the client, 
especially if the client’s experience is not to be the source of resolution. 
 
III.  The Philosophers of Change: Sophism, Materialism, and Postmodernism 
Also with origins in ancient Greece is a tradition that is decidedly different in its 
approach to knowledge, human subjectivity, and ethics.  This tradition is “anti-
foundationalist” in its assumptions, rejecting the idea that defining a fixed character of 
“being” represents the central mission of philosophy.  As such, it has a more open and 
relativistic approach to knowledge, ethics, and the social practices of life. 
In ancient Greece this position was represented in a tradition known as sophism.  
One of the leading proponents of sophism was Protagoras, a contemporary of Socrates.   
Protagoras maintained a position in sharp contrast to Socrates on the issues of sense 
experience, knowledge, and artistic expression.  
To the Sophist “man is the measure of all things.”
6
  Consequently, what human 
being’s sense constitutes the limit of their understanding.  Contrary to Socrates, truth is 
contained in appearances, as the limit to what can be called knowledge.  Experience is a 
subjective phenomenon from which different perceptions and, ultimately, different 
conclusions might result.  Without the foundation provided by the “forms,” the Sophist 
leave open the possibility of multiple truths and a human understanding of a world that 
 8 
has a variety of interpretations.  The world is a place of aesthetic judgment, not rigid 
doctrine and “laws of nature.”   
As a human enterprise, the measure of a written statute or practice can only be the 
culture or condition in which it arises.  Claims to truth are relative to context.   As the 
sophist, Thrasymachus, points out in the Republic, all claims to “justice” can only be 
measured against the prevailing political system in which acts occurs.
7
   
History is treated as an interpretive story of human existence, requiring constant 
reinterpretation.  It is a story that must be constantly reassessed and retold as the 
conditions of life, new technologies, and new circumstances arise.  Engaging a story of 
human life is a creative act.  Protagoras emphasized this point by suggesting that many of 
the Sophists are engaged in various forms of artistic endeavors.   
Without a realm of “forms,” social life is characterized by what Socrates refers to 
in the Phaedrus as rhetoric.
8
   Rhetoric, as Socrates describes it, is the shifting of ground, 
with the design of misleading people.  But rhetoric, as the art of persuasion, is all that 
remains as a human task when references to the transcendent are denied.  Rhetoric is 
precisely what the Sophist teach, as it is the social responsibility of those with intellectual 
prowess to be engaged in promoting and directing the most utilitarian forms of social life.  
However, with the coming of Christianity and its strong affinity to transcendentalism, 
sophism retreats as a public philosophy.   
After the Middle Ages, the role of experience begins to make a return in Western 
philosophy.  Sir Francis Bacon stressed inductive logic as a means to create knowledge 
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from the world from raw sensation.
9
  Empiricism, culminating is David Hume, 
emphasized the significance of sensation for all claims to truth in the world.
10
  However, 
it is with Nineteenth Century materialism that the production of knowledge is linked 
directly to experience within a process of historical change. 
Materialism embraces the idea expressed by Heraclitus in saying that reality is 
change.
11
  However, the notion of “change” within materialism is multifaceted.  Change 
refers to the fact that the material of the world transforms, comes in and out of existence, 
and is subject to constant mutation.  Change also refers to the social and historical 
conditions in which individuals find themselves.  Technology, communications, science, 
and environmental conditions all constitute a context in which human beings live their 
lives.   Change, within materialist doctrine, also refers to the conditions in which human 
consciousness is shaped.  Consciousness is a refection of the real concrete activities of 
human beings.
12
  What we think, is shaped by what we do.  Therefore, change is also the 
character of human subjects, as their understanding of themselves and the world is 
transformed by the experiences they have as part of the historical process.   
In the Twentieth Century the poststructuralists have developed the idea of 
materialism into a theory of knowledge that contextualizes the generation of “truth” in 
the world, severing the links between the process of discourse and the capturing of the 
world’s essential “being.”  The poststructuralists reject the idea that knowledge reflects a 
transcendental “forms,” or absolute being.  To paraphrase Nietzsche, “truth” represents a 
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host of metaphors and anthropomorphisms that we use to describe the world.
13
  Truth is 
the name we give to our mental creations that have helped us survive.  Contextually 
derived, our truths are subject to constant contextual pressures for change.  As context 
also has a political component, the poststructuralists draw significant attention to the role 
of power in shaping what human beings believe about the world.  The ability to control 
what enters the domain of discourse is the ability to shape how individuals view 
themselves and their relations within society.
14
   
The political context for the generation of philosophical discourse has produced 
sentiments in the poststructualists that echo, in a modified fashion, some of the claims of 
the claims of Nineteenth Century materialism.  Michel Foucault’s well-known criticism 
of the “normalizing” tendencies of psychiatry speaks to the nexus of knowledge and 
power in which human being find themselves.  From this perspective, the subject is 
constructed by the external social, technological, and political contexts in which they 
live.  Institutions, as the locus of power, shape human beings in a way that conforms with 
institutional necessity, not in a way that reflects a conception of the “natural form” of 
human life.  Capitalism, as one of those institutions, also represents a way in which sets 
of norms and expectations are generated within social life.  Capitalism shapes our 
consciousness through desire, production, and repression.  This matter is discussed by 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in a work entitled Anti-Oedipus.  The altering our self-
understanding by technology and communications is reflected in Jean Baudrillard’s “The 
Ecstasy of Communications.”
15
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The transformation of subjectivity cannot be divorced from a redefinition of 
ethics and morals.  The definition of subjectivity includes a set of expectations with 
regard to action.  If the array of expected actions is altered by context, then the rationale 
for a new behavior, in the form of a new “code of ethics” will be required.   Ethics and 
morals, as reflections of historical contingencies, will be relative to the needs of time and 
place.   
In a counseling setting there is a clear distinction between what the alternatives of 
absolutism and relativism can produce.  If the absolutists could be accused of creating a 
condition that was too static for the rapid pace of change in the Twenty First Century, the 
materialist tradition could be accused of producing a loss of grounding in the client.  An 
overwhelming sense of anomie could result in more, rather than less, conflict and tension.  
The quality of change is also another issue.  Not all change is good change and the 
quality of change cannot be ignored.  Fads, peer pressure, and conforming to trends, can 
equally produce a condition with which the client is ultimately uncomfortable, if change 
is grasps for its own sake.  
 On issues of sex, family, and employment, the relativist view presents striking 
alternatives to the more static conception of subjectivity.  If one accepts the view that 
mores, ethics, and practices are driven by historical conditions as experienced by the 
subject, then adapting to changes in context will be perceived as part of the natural 
processes of human existence.  Within the relativistic context, there can be no static 
condition of the “normal” to which the individual must be conditioned.  Birth control and 
abortion rights have altered the context for sexual relations in the Western world.  From 
this perspective, the ethics of sex have changed as a result of the technology.  The family, 
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as a unit for the reproduction of society, has undergone a change as images of “alternative 
lifestyles” disseminate through various forms of communications media.  Work has also 
undergone a change, from the decline of labor unions to the increasing number of 
telecommuters in the information age.   
 The ethics of new practices are always a story to be told.  A client’s search for a 
“sense of self” within this larger process of historical change is likely to be one of the 
ongoing issues within philosophical counseling.  The choice for the individual involves 
either a retreat into more static concepts or a process of becoming more comfortable with 
change and incorporating change into a sense of personal identity.    
 
IV.  The Counselor’s Role 
 “Meta-ethical relativism” is a stance within the context of Western philosophy.  
How can the counselor’s role be defined in a way that not only takes into account this 
conflict in philosophy, but also confronts the other areas of tension within philosophy? 
To put this another way, what responsibility does the counselor have in confronting the 
perennial questions of philosophy in a setting in which someone is seeking assistance to a 
concrete problem?  As stated above, there is no neutral ground on which to stand, as even 
framing the questions represents a “leading” of the client in one direction rather than 
another. (Something for which Socrates represents the quintessential example!)  There is 
no escape from the personal biases and conceptual frameworks that a counselor will use 
in analyzing a particular circumstance.   
 There are three ways to address this problem.  The first approach is to limit the 
role of the counselor to that of “midwife.”  In this case the counselor assists the client in 
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articulating a questions and then offers the variety of solutions that the history of Western 
(and perhaps Non-Western) philosophy has to offer.  In this model the counselor has the 
role of facilitating the client’s understanding of the range of choice that such a question 
can generate.  In this “smorgesborg” approach, the client can simply select a response 
with which he or she is most comfortable and which seems to best solve the immediate 
problem.   
 The attraction of this approach is that it comes as close to some ideal of neutrality 
as seems possible, given the limits of our abilities in that area.  In this setting the client 
should have the freedom to express his or her ideas and come to a resolution with which 
they are comfortable.  The counselor is in the relatively “safe” role of facilitator, avoiding 
taking a position that might challenge or push the client to alternative understandings of 
the conditions in question.   
 However, the supposed neutrality comes at a cost.  In the role of “living 
encyclopedia” the counselor must also stay somewhat disengaged.  This is likely to 
produce an effect in which real dialogue is sacrificed for the sake of maintaining an 
antiseptic separation between client and counselor.  In that context a “real” and honest 
exchange cannot take place.  This setting is likely not to produce dialogue, and it is likely 
not to be greatly beneficial to either the client or the counselor.
16
 
 The second option pushes the client by having the counselor take a position 
contrary to that of the client’s position in the course of discussions.  While not strictly a 
“dialectical” strategy, it may be that confronting an opposite position may lead  a client to 
explore resolutions previously not considered.  This can have the effect of pushing the 
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client to become more conscious of his or her own beliefs, as they find themselves 
continually forced to construct and articulate a reply to the challenges of the counselor.      
Obviously, this can be a rather confrontational strategy and can lead estrangement 
between the client and counselor if taken to an extreme. 
 The third approach takes as it premise the impossibility of finding true 
“neutrality.”  Therefore, such a strategy seeks to adjust the relationship between 
counselor and client in a way that opens up dialogue.  In this context the counselor is free 
to express an opinion only after a “full disclosure” of the beliefs and biases held by the 
counselor.  In this setting there is no surreptitious agenda.  The “cards are put on the 
table” as a precondition for an open and honest dialogue.  In such a context both parties 
have the opportunity to grow and change as part of the process.  As many clients are 
likely to seek assistance to specific problems, they may benefit from the expression of 
alternative viewpoints that recast their problems in new ways.  It also demonstrates 
respect for the client, as they are treated as a human being capable of engaging in the real 
exchange of ideas, rather than as an object to be kept at a distance. 
 Obviously, this does not mean that the counselor should not be sensitive to a 
range of possible solutions to a given problem.  However, by encouraging an exchange of 
assumptions and premises at the outset the counselor and client have the best chance to 
engage in the kind of discussion that leads to personal growth.  This approach will not be 
for all clients and counselors.  Some counselors may find it difficult to expose themselves 
in the process of counseling.  Some clients may simply want their own positions clarified 
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or want their own ideas echoed back to them.  However, for those seeking a real 
dialogue, philosophical counseling has the potential to provide a beneficial experience. 
 An experienced counselor is likely to employ all three of these techniques.  
Providing an array of possibilities is a good place to start.  One has to assume that the 
clients are there to explore new ways of thinking.  In that case, challenging the client to 
explore alternatives is necessary to that process.  However, in all of those discussions the 
counselor should be very honest with the client in relating their own views and biases 
(often a very difficult task).  The counselor can not lose sight of the fact that they are also 
building a relationship, and that can only be accomplished with an honest exchange of 
ideas. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
Even as a new profession, philosophical counseling cannot escape the ancient 
debates of philosophy.  How do we make claims to knowledge?  What is the nature of 
human subjectivity?  Are we products of will or conditions?  Today, even the debate 
between Socrates and the sophists over the issue of payment for philosophical education 
has returned.  Does taking payment turn philosophy into a commodity, implying tacit 
support of the institutions of capitalism and private accumulation?  Answers to such 
questions will not rely on facts, but on assumptions. 
So where does this take philosophical counseling in the future?  It must be 
recognized that counseling activity does not imply a sterile relationship between 
counselors and clients.  Both counselors and counselees have assumptions about the 
world.  However, at its most basic level, counseling is an activity of exploration between 
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two people to solve a practical problem using an array of techniques and ideas.  But, as 
the example of Socrates is perhaps most illustrative, technique cannot be separated from 
content because it assigns validity and significance to the concepts employed.  
 The tension between absolutism and relativism is only one such matter that will 
influence the context of discussions.  Does the counselor, as Marinoff suggests, assume 
“free will” in order to make the counselee a morally responsible agent?
17
  Should the 
counselor assume wage labor is a form of “slavery” as a precondition to workplace 
problems?  Is the body a locus of “sin” or is a life of sensual pleasure something to be 
enjoyed for its own sake?  These are fundamental questions, and to suggest that a 
counselor will not let his or her beliefs filter through in the counseling process is as 
misguided as it is misdirected. 
 Ironically, I agree with Marinoff with regard to the likely outcome of 
philosophical counseling’s evolution.  “Just as with psychological/psychiatric counseling, 
in which Freudian, Jungian, Adlerian, Reichian, Laingian, eclectic, and many other 
models may be applied, practical diversity can serve to enrich, rather than to impoverish, 
the experience of counselor and counselee alike."
18
  I believe that this statement is not 
only true, but it is the key to the development of philosophical counseling’s future as a 
profession.  Freudians, Jungians, as well as the other schools of psychological counseling, 
do not hide their biases.  They revel in them.  Clients seek out counselors, not in spite of 
their beliefs, but because of them.  They are expected to bring those biases into the 
counselor/client relationship.  Philosophical counseling should not be so lofty or myopic 
that it does not see both the desirability and the necessity of such a condition. 
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